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NOTES
In Re J.M.P.:1 The Louisiana Supreme Court Speaks in
the Area of Private Adoption
[Tihe earliest and most hallowed of the ties that bind humanity,
in all countries considered sacred, is the relationship of parent
and child.2
I. INTRODUCTION
An unmarried, eighteen year old mother who had surrendered her
child for a private adoption3 later challenged that adoption on several
grounds. First, she claimed that the act of surrender was invalid for
two reasons. Her parents, she complained, refused to allow her to return
to their home with the child and declined to contribute to its support.
She contended that these threats amounted to duress. Further, she com-
plained that the attorney who represented her was a partner of the
attorney for the adopting parents and, for that reason, acted under a
conflict of interest. Second, and in the alternative, she argued that the
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.
1. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988).
2. In re Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976) (Justice Raper of the Wyoming
Supreme Court paraphrasing a statement made in Bryant v. Kurtz, 134 Ind. App. 480,
189 N.E.2d 593 (1963)).
3. "The practice of adoption is traceable back to antiquity: it was recognized in
the Babylonian codes of Hammurabi." Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-
1983, 17 Fain. L.Q. 173, 173 (1983). The practice was brought to Rome from Greece,
J. Declareuil, Rome the Law-Giver 119 (1970). The origin of modern civil law adoption
in Louisiana is found in the law of Justinian, Book I, Title VII. The Digest of Justinian,
Vol. I (C. Monro trans. 1904). By Justinian's time, adoption had developed Into a highly
regulated process with rather sophisticated laws. See also W. Buckland, A Textbook of
Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian 122-28 (2d ed. 1950); Huard, The Law of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 743 (1956). For a historical perspective
on adoption in the United States, see Presser, The Historical Background of the American
Law of Adoption, 11 J. Faro. L. 443 (1971); McCaullff, The First English Adoption Law
and Its American Precursors, 16 Seton Hall L. Rev. 656 (1986), In Louisiana, adoption
was introduced under Spanish rule; however, It was abolished under the Civil Code of
1808. It was reinstated by the legislature by 1865 La. Acts No, 48, Prior to this act, an
adoption could only be granted by authorization from the legislature, Roy v, Speer, 249
La. 1034, 1038, 192 So. 2d 554, 556 (1966), The current adoption statutes are progressions
of the law since 1865. See generally Wadlington, Adoption of Persons Under Seventeen
in Louisiana, 36 Tul. L. Rev. 201, 202-05 (1962).
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adoption was not in the best interest of the child. The supreme court
held that the threats of the mother's parents did not constitute duress
and, further, that the attorney's alleged conflict of interest did not vitiate
the mother's consent. The court did, however, find merit in the mother's
alternative claim. According to the court, the trial court, which failed
to consider the possible psychological effects of the adoption on the
child and instead relied primarily on the relative financial resources of
the alternative sets of parents, incorrectly determined that the adoption
was in the child's best interest. Accordingly, the supreme court remanded
the case to the trial court to make a new determination of the interest
of the child pursuant to the guidelines set out in the opinion. 4 In re
J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988).
The supreme court's decision in this case is significant for a number
of reasons. First, the case represents the first time that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has defined the term "the best interest of the child"
as used in the private adoption statutes. The guidelines enunciated by
the court are designed to determine whether an adoption is in the child's
best interest when the natural parent revokes his or her consent., Second,
the court recognized what has become a serious problem with private
adoptions-that disputes are not being resolved 'expeditiously-and took
steps to alleviate the problem. The supreme court emphasized that courts
must settle private adoption disputes faster to allow the natural parent
a fair opportunity to have her child returned and to minimize the risk
of psychological harm to the child.6 Accordingly, the court requested
remedial legislation to provide specific time periods within which lower
courts must render judgment in private adoption disputes. 7 Recognizing
that immediate legislative action might not be forthcoming, the court
devised an interim solution: it set forth several new procedural rules
designed to expedite private adoption litigation.' Because these rules give
private adoption cases priority in the scheduling of cases on the court
dockets, the rules will affect not only attorneys who practice in the
family law area, but also other members of the profession.
4. The appellate court in Pontiff v. Behrens, 518 So. 2d 23 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1987) used James Myles Pontiff, the full name of the parties in the suit; however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court used only the parties initials to preserve their anonymity. As
the first circuit did not follow this procedure, the supreme court may be sending a subtle
message to the lower courts that anonymity is the proper procedure in cases involving
private adoption disputes.
5. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1015. The court makes it clear that the guidelines set forth
are not to be used in other types of custody disputes. Compare this definition of "best
interest" with the use of the term in Louisiana Civil Code article 146(B) (child custody).
6. 528 So. 2d at 1016-17.
7. See infra text accompanying note 114.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 113-121.
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The purpose of this note is to review the most significant aspects
of the JMP decision. In the opening section, a brief general overview
of the statutes governing private adoption, including those that were
implicated in JMP, will be presented. Next, the note will address the
supreme court's handling of the natural mother's claim that "duress"
and her attorney's alleged conflict of interest affected her consent to
the act of surrender. The paper will then explore and critique the supreme
court's new guidelines for determining the "best interest of the child."
The fourth part of the note will examine the court's new procedural
rules for expediting the resolution of private adoption disputes and the
relationship of those rules to the private adoption statutes. Finally, the
conclusion will provide a discussion of proposed solutions to several of
the problems identified in the earlier sections of the comment.
II. PRIVATE ADOPTION IN LOUISIANA
In Louisiana, adoptions have been subjected to stringent regulation
by the legislature. The legislature has authorized only two types of
adoption-"agency" adoption and "private" adoption. The agency
adoption is effected through an organization licensed by the Louisiana
Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) or by DHHR
itself. 9 An agency adoption generally takes more time to complete,
primarily because of the state's heavy involvement in the process.' 0 To
provide would-be adoptive parents with a streamlined and flexible al-
ternative to the agency adoption, the legislature established the "private"
adoption. This alternative means of adoption, in contrast to the agency
adoption, is not subject to direct state control and supervision." Rec-
ognizing that the absence of official state involvement in the private
adoption process might open the door to abuses of various kinds,'
2
9. La. R.S. 9:401 (Supp. 1988).
10. Selected Legislation of the 1979 Regular Session-A Student Commentary, 40 La.
L. Rev. 437, 466-67 (1980) [hereinafter A Student Commentary].
11. See, e.g., Comment, Parental Consent: The Need For An Informed Decision In
The Private Adoption Scheme, 47 La. L. Rev. 889, 890 (1987); A Student Commentary,
supra note 10, at 469; cf. F.D. v. Associated Catholic Charities of New Orleans, Inc.,
480 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), writ denied, 481 So. 2d 1353 (1986) (acknowl-
edging that private adoptions do not provide the same procedural safeguards as agency
adoptions, resulting in a greater probability of abuse with the private adoption); see also
La. R.S. 9:423-29 (Supp. 1988), which provide that once the petition for adoption is filed
with the proper court, the only information supplied to the court is an investigative report
of the DHHR concerning the suitability of the adopting parents and the type of living
conditions they appear to provide for the child, with the focus of the report on the
adopting parents. Therefore, the statutes do not allow the natural parent, or any other
interested party outside of the DHHR, to submit documentation or question the viability
of the adoption form the standpoint of the child's best interest.
12. F.D. v. Associated Catholic Charities of New Orleans, Inc., 480 So. 2d 380, 383
(La. App. 4th Cir 1985), writ denied, 481 So. 2d 1353 (1986).
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particularly the unfair treatment of the surrendering parent, the legis-
lature imposed stringent procedural requirements upon that process,
requirements that generally have no parallel in the agency adoption
context, with the enactment of the Private Adoption Act. 3
The private adoption process begins with a voluntary act of surrender
executed by the natural parent. The statutes recognize two forms for
the act of surrender-authentic and notarial. 4 For the purposes of this
note, only the authentic act of surrender need be addressed. In order
to qualify as an authentic act of surrender, the act must contain the
various elements required by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.6.11 One
13. 1979 La. Acts No. 686, § 1.
14. La. R.S. 9:422.3 (Supp. 1988), as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 702, §1,
provides for both an authentic and a notarial act of surrender. However, the statute only
acknowledges the notarial act of surrender indirectly without providing a definition or
substance other than a notarial act, which does not recite every element required by
Revised Statutes 9:422.6 (Supp. 1988) (authentic act of surrender). See In re R.L.V., 484
So. 2d 206, 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (The court held "that an act, authentic in form
but which does not contain all enumerated elements for a 'fail-safe' act of surrender
provided for by La. R.S. 9:422.3 through 422.14, can, nevertheless, suffice as a 'notarial
act' for the purposes of applying La. R.S. 9:429." The court relied in part on Note, In
Re CDT: The Need For Greater Clarity in Private Adoption, 44 La. L. Rev. 845 (1984),
and its interpretation of legislative intent. Legislative intent was evidenced by the 1979
amendments retention of the notarial act language in the statutes. 1979 La. Acts No.
686, §1.); cf. 1988 La Acts No. 411, effective September 1, 1988, which amends La. R.S.
9;440.1 and validates all acts of surrender executed prior to January 1, 1988.
In JMP the dispute concerned an authentic act of surrender.
15. La. R.S, 9;422.6 (Supp. 1988) states:
A. The authentic act of voluntary surrender for private adoption shall contain
the following:
(1) The complete name of the mother and the father if his name is stated on
the child's birth certificate or an application for certificate in the event the
certificate has not been issued.
(2) The parish of each indicated parent's domicile.
(3) The age of each indicated parent.
(4) The marital status of the parents,
(5) The parish In which child was born.
(6) The names of each prospective adoptive married couple or other person
qualified to petition for adoption of the child, or the name and address of the
attorney at law who is acting as the representative of the adoptive parent or
parents.
(7) The date of birth of the child to be surrendered.
(8) The name given the child, if any, on the application for birth certificate,
or on the official birth certificate,
(9) A declaration that the act is not being signed earlier than the fifth day
following the birth of the child, using the method of computing as set out in
the Code of Civil Procedure Art, 5059,
(10) A declaration that the parent or parents, and their legal representatives, if
applicable, freely and voluntarily surrender custody of the child for the purpose
of private placement and adoption and that the parent, parents, and legal
[Vol. 49
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of the more important of these elements is a certification that the
surrendering parent has been advised by an attorney. 6 By requiring that
the act of surrender include these elements, the legislature intended to
ensure that a natural parent who gives up her child for adoption un-
derstands the significance and legal ramifications of her actions. That
the parent have this understanding is critically important, for signing
the act of surrender creates a legal presumption that the natural parent
has fully and voluntarily given her consent to the act of surrender. 7
In addition to the elements necessary for an authentic act of sur-
render, the private adoption statutes provide two other safeguards for
the surrendering mother. First, the mother may not execute a valid act
of surrender before the fifth day after the birth of the child. 8 Second,
the natural mother may revoke her consent to the act of surrender if
she does so "within thirty days after executing the authentic act of
surrender."19
representatives, if applicable, consent to the adoption.
(11) A declaration that the parent, parents, and legal representatives, if appli-
cable, have been advised by an attorney other than the attorney for the pro-
spective adoptive parent or parents that all parental rights are to be terminated
upon executing the act, provided by R.S. 9:422.8, subject, however, to the right
to oppose the adoption, as provided by R.S. 9:422.10 and 422.11, if exercised
timely in the manner provided by R.S. 9:422.10.
(12) A declaration that notice and service of any pleading of any sort in any
subsequent adoption proceeding is waived.
(13) A declaration that the natural parents, or either of them, lacks full con-
tractual capacity, if applicable, by virtue of minority or other legal disability.
(14) A declaration that a natural parent who does not have full contractual
capacity is joined in the act of surrender by that parent's tutor, guardian,
curator, or other legal representative.
B. Each person whose signature is required on an act of surrender must sign
the act in the presence of a notary and two witnesses. The notary shall affix
his official seal to as many originals of the acts as are executed.
16. Id.
17. La. R.S. 9:422.3 (Supp. 1988) states in the pertinent part: "The act of surrender
shall be presumptive evidence of a legal and voluntary surrender only if it contains every
element required by R.S. 9:422.6, and is in all other respects executed in accordance with
the provisions of this subpart."
18. La. R.S. 9:422.7 (Supp. 1988). Note that these requirements for a valid act of
surrender are used in reference to an authentic act of surrender only. Due to the nebulous
character of the notarial act of surrender-there are neither statutes nor case law defining
a "notarial act of surrender"-it is uncertain whether any of the requirements for a valid
authentic act of surrender are applicable to the notarial act, including the "five day"
rule of Revised Statutes 9:422.7.
19. La. R.S. 9:422.10 (Supp. 1988). Note that Revised Statutes 9:422.6, which lists
the requirements of the authentic act of surrender, states that the act constitutes "irrev-
ocable consent" of the consenting natural parent. This language is misleading on its face
because it specifically states that the consent given is "irrevocable." However, the possibility
of opposition and revocation of consent are referred to only by their respective statute
19891
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Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.10 requires that the revocation be
"a clear and written declaration of intention to oppose the adoption
and [the natural mother's] desire to revoke the consent previously given
in the act of surrender." 20 The revocation, however, is not absolute: it
does not ensure the return of the child. 21 Instead, the revocation of
consent triggers a hearing by the court to determine whether permitting
the adoption would be in the best interest of the child.
22
number ("except as specifically provided in R.S. 9:422.10 and 422.11"; La. R.S. 9:422.10
(Supp. 1988) provides for the opposition to the adoption by a revocation of consent and
La. R.S. 9:422.11 (Supp. 1988) is the legal effect of the revocation.) The statute's emphasis
is on the "irrevocability" of consent, not the equally important exception of revocation.
The emphasis supports the requirement that the natural parent have independent legal
counsel at the execution of the act of surrender.
20. La. R.S. 9:422.10 (Supp. 1988) states:
A. The parent or parents, and their legal representative, if applicable, or the
child's tutor, who executed the authentic act of voluntary surrender, may oppose
the adoption of the child only within thirty days after executing the authentic
act of surrender. Such opposition or attempted revocation of consent shall be
made only by a clear and written declaration of intention to oppose the adoption
and their desire to revoke the consent previously given in the act of surrender.
21. La. R.S. 9:422.11 (Supp. 1988) states:
A. The written declaration by either or both of the natural parents, or his,
her, or their legal representatives, if applicable, or the child's tutor, provided
for in R.S. 9:422.10, who executed the authentic act of voluntary surrender
shall not bar a decree of adoption if the decree is in the best interests of the
child.
In the case of In re G.O., 433 So. 2d 1115 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), the court states:
The formal act of surrender thus has the threefold effect of (1) transferring
the custody of the child to the person or persons named in the act; (2) granting
the consent of the surrendering parent or parents to the adoption, subject to
the rights of the parent or parents to withdraw consent within thirty days; and
(3) termination of all parental rights. This right to revoke consent has the limited
effect of giving the surrendering parent or parents standing to oppose the
adoption. It has no effect on the transfer of custody effected by the formal
act of surrender or the termination of parental rights.
433 So. 2d at 1117.
22. Revised Statutes 9:422.11 provides that the revocation of consent "shall not bar
a decree of adoption if the decree is in the best interest of the child." The court in JMP
states that the revocation of consent creates the necessity for a hearing by the trial court
to make the best interest determination. JMP, 528 So. 2d 1002, 1012 (La. 1988). It is
noteworthy that section 422.11 provides that after the thirty day period for revocation
has expired and an interlocutory decree has been granted by the court without opposition,
the adoption can only be prevented if the Louisiana Department of Health and Human
Resources (DHHR) issues a report that the adopting parents are unfit and the court agrees
with the report after conducting a best interest hearing. Section 422.11 was amended by
1987 La. Acts No. 702, §1 (effective July 9, 1987), to change the requirement from "or"
to "and," giving the court discretion to permit the adoption even when the DHHR finds
the adopting parents unfit. Section 427 sets out the elements required to be reviewed and
reported within the DHHR's confidential report. Note that in Hargrave v. Gaspard, 419
So. 2d 918 (La. 1982), the court held that the adopting parents have no right of access
to the confidential report. See also La. R.S. 9:429, 432 (Supp. 1988).
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III. VITIATION OF CONSENT
A. Duress
One week after the birth of her child, Dawn B., the natural mother,
executed an authentic act of surrender at the home of Mr. and Mrs.
B., her mother and step-father, where she resided. According to her
testimony at the hearing, Dawn wanted to keep her child; however, she
began to consider other options after her mother and step-father in-
formed her that they were not willing to assist in the child's rearing
and support. Initially Dawn considered an abortion but she abandoned
the idea after she learned that she was too far into her pregnancy.
Subsequently, she contacted an attorney who arranged for a private
adoption of the child by his clients, Mr. and Mrs. J.M.P. Believing
that she had no alternative but to sign the act of surrender, Dawn went
through with the adoption. Dawn never informed her attorney of her
desire to keep the child. Later, Dawn sought to undo the adoption on
the ground that the actions of her parents constituted duress sufficient
to vitiate her consent. Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate
court found that the evidence failed to support this claim.
Reviewing the determination on appeal, the supreme court began by
setting forth the applicable law. The court acknowledged that the private
adoption statutes do not provide any method for the annulment of an
act of surrender when consent has been vitiated.23 The court noted,
however, that it had already filled this gap in the law by holding, in
several prior cases, that one may annul an act of surrender if its execution
was induced by error, fraud, or duress. 24 The definition of duress,
provided in Louisiana Civil Code article 1959, the court observed, con-
tains both an objective and a subjective element. 25 Thus, to evaluate a
23. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1007-08; see also La. Civ. Code arts. 2029-35 (nullity of
contracts).
24. Wuertz v. Craig, 458 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1984). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1948;
JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1008 n. 3; (citing cases in other jurisdictions consistent with this
view); In re Shavor, 428 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 155
(1983); Ball v. Campbell, 219 La. 1076, 55 So. 2d 250 (1951).
25. La. Civ. Code art. 1959 states:
Consent is vitiated when it has been obtained by duress of such a nature as
to cause a reasonable fear of unjust and considerable injury to a party's person,
property, or reputation.
Age, health, disposition, and other personal circumstances of a party must be
taken into account in determining reasonableness of the fear.
Further, comment (b) of this statute addresses duress in relation to contracts and consent.
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the comment states that there is duress
when "a person makes an improper threat that induces a party who has no reasonable
alternative to manifest his assent. The result of this type of duress is that the contract
that is created is voidable by the victim."
1989]
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claim of duress, one must determine whether a reasonable person with
the same individual characteristics as the complaining party would have
felt compelled to consent to the contract under the same type of threat.
26
However, if the "threat" is to exercise a legal right or to do a lawful
act, duress does not occur, even if the threat does influence the com-
plaining party's decision. 27 The court further noted that the party as-
serting duress bears the burden of proof, for a validly executed authentic
act of surrender creates a presumption that the parties to it freely and
voluntarily gave their consent.
2
1
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the supreme court
concluded that Dawn's consent had not been vitiated by duress. Ac-
cording to the court, the kind of pressure exerted by Dawn's mother
did not pose a threat of considerable injury to Dawn's person, property,
or reputation. Further, the court held that it was Mr. and Mrs. B.'s
legal right not to allow Dawn to raise her child in their home. Therefore,
the court reasoned, even if the threat was the sole reason for Dawn's
consent, there still was no duress. 29
Although the record of the court of appeal and the supreme court
are not entirely clear on this point, the natural mother in JMP apparently
overlooked a possible argument that might have been marshalled in
support of her claim of duress, an argument based upon the alimentary
duties of ascendants and descendants. 30 Louisiana imposes a legal ob-
ligation upon a parent to maintain his child who is in need, whether
that child is a minor or a major.3' The legal obligation extends beyond
the parent-child relationship to other ascendant-descendant relationships,
26. Benner v. Van Norden, 27 La. Ann. 473, 477 (1875); Lewis v. Lewis, 387 So.
2d 1206, 1210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); see also 4 Aubry and Rau, Cours De Droit Civil
Francais #343a (6th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1965) (Contracts-Vices of Consent).
27. La. Civ. Code art. 1962 states: "A threat of doing a lawful act or a threat of
exercising a right does not constitute duress.
A threat of doing an act that is lawful in appearance only may constitute duress."
See Adams v. Adams, 503 So. 2d 1052, 1057 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
28. La. R.S. 9:422.3, 422.6 (Supp. 1988); see generally Couder v. Oteri, 34 La. Ann.
694 (1882) (notes executed by the plaintiff were found valid because plaintiff did not
carry his burden of proving the alleged duress).
29. See La. Civ. Code art. 1962.
30. See La. Civ. Code art. 1959 quoted at supra note 25. See also La. Civ. Code
art. 229, which states:
Children are bound to maintain their father and mother and other ascendents,
who are in need, and the relatives in the direct ascending line are likewise bound
to maintain their needy descendents, this obligation being reciprocal. This re-
ciprocal obligation is limited to life's basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter,
and health care, and arises only upon proof of inability to obtain these necessities
by other means or from other sources.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 229; Tolley v. Karcher, 196 La. 685, 200 So. 4 (1941); Dubroc
v. Dubroc, 284 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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for example, that between grandparent and grandchild.12 The alimentary
obligation, which is limited to the necessities of food, shelter, clothing,
and health care, arises upon proof that the party seeking support is
unable to provide these items for himself or through some other source
and that the other party is able to pay the alimony a. 3 Thus, if the
natural mother in JMP had put on proof that she was unable to support
herself, that she had no source of support other than her parents, and
that her parents were able to pay the alimony, then she could have
argued that her parents owed her, and perhaps the child as well, a duty
of support. 34 Assuming that the parents did owe the natural mother
such an alimentary obligation, then the parents' threat to cut off support
to the natural mother and the child did not constitute the exercise of
a valid legal right."
32. See Tobin v. Tobin, 323 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), writ refused, 325
So. 2d 613 (1976).
33. Id.; See also Dubroc, 284 So. 2d 869; Johnson v. Johnson, 128 So. 2d 779 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961). See generally I Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law No. 674 (12th
ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959) Planiol stated that there were two conditions necessary
to find "need": "(1) The creditor of the alimony must be in need, i.e. he must not be
in a position to secure, by himself, some means of support, (2) The debtor must be able
to pay the alimony."
34. La. Civ. Code art. 233 states:
If the person, whose duty it is to furnish alimony, shall prove that he is unable
to pay the same, the judge may, after examining into the case, order that such
person shall receive in his house, and there support and maintain the person
to whom he owes alimony.
La. Civ. Code art. 234 states:
The judge shall pronounce likewise whether the father or mother who may offer
to receive, support and maintain the child, to whom he or she may owe alimony,
in his or her house, shall be dispensed in that case from the obligation of
paying for it elsewhere.
35. See Tobin, 323 So. 2d 896. Expanding the theory of a reciprocal alimentary
obligation, is there an inchoate obligation created between the child and the grandparents
prior to birth? The Louisiana Supreme Court in Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151,
1152-53 (La. 1984), recognized an unborn child's right in property as an addition to those
rights of the unborn child already recognized in the Civil Code in the areas of inheritance,
donations, contracts, and torts. It could be argued that the alimony is a property right
created by the legislature with Civil Code articles 229, 233, and 234.
In Malek, the natural mother was recognized as the tutrix of the unborn child. The
theoretical argument would be that the natural mother's consent to the adoption may be
on behalf of her unborn child, in her capacity as tutrix, as well as herself. Extending
this concept, the duress could apply to either the natural mother or the unborn child,
through the tutrix. The unborn child would probably qualify as "in need," thereby
imposing alimentary duties on the grandparents. By refusing to assist in the support and
rearing of their grandchild, when Dawn could not provide the support alone, the grand-
parents have violated their legal obligation. Because the grandparents no longer have a
legal right to refuse the unborn child their home, the threat to Dawn is duress against
the child through the tutrix. The duress vitiates the consent of the child; therefore, the
act of surrender is null and void. See La. Civ. Code art. 1948 and 1959; Ball v. Campbell,
219 La. 1076, 55 So. 2d 250 (1951).
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In resolving the duress issue in JMP, the supreme court certainly
broke no new ground. On the contrary, the court's decision was well
within the mainstream of prior Louisiana decisions on this subject. In
a case similar to JMP, In re Giambrone,3 6 a twenty year old, unmarried
mother claimed that her consent to the adoption had been vitiated by
her mother's refusal to allow her to bring the baby home. The fourth
circuit reached the same conclusion as did the court in JMP: there was
no duress. In making its determination, the court considered the age of
the natural mother and the fact that she did not seek any other means
of support for the child.37 Also, the court took into account the maturity,
education, and background of the natural mother as factors negating
duress."' In Giambrone the court upheld the concept that the urging of
the natural mother by her own mother, physician, and priest to surrender
the child was mere counseling, not duress or undue influence.3 9
Louisiana courts have consistently held that the fact that the natural
mother was emotionally upset and crying at the time of signing the act
of surrender does not sustain a finding of duress.4 0 Nor is there duress
if the natural mother merely vacillated in her decision to consent to the
adoption. 41 In such situations, the courts have found, the mother's
exercise of volition is free and untainted by any vice of consent.
In only one case, Wuertz v. Craig,42 has the Louisiana Supreme
Court found that duress vitiated the consent of the natural mother. The
natural mother consented to the adoption after her grandmother threat-
ened to bring criminal charges against her if she did not sign the act
of surrender. However, there was no legal basis for the criminal charges.
Although the grandmother made the threat in the presence of her at-
torney and the attorney knew that the charges were groundless, he
remained silent. Under these circumstances, the court concluded, there
was duress sufficient to vitiate consent.43
36. 262 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
37. Id. at 569. The court made note of the fact that the natural mother's action for
return of the child was due solely to her subsequent marriage.
38. Cases in other jurisdictions consistent with the reasoning of the Giambrone case
include: Anonymous v. Anonymous, 23 Ariz. App. 50, 530 P.2d 896 (1975); In re
Wojtkowiak, 14 Il1. App. 2d 344, 144 N.E.2d 760 (1957); In re Allon, 356 Mich. 586,
97 N.W.2d 744 (1959); Batt v. Nebraska Children's Home Soc'y, 185 Neb. 124, 174
N.W.2d 88 (1970).
39. Giambrone, 262 So. 2d at 569.
40. State ex rel M.B., 493 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986); Allen v. Volunteers
of America, 378 So. 2d 1030 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); In re Giambrone, 262 So. 2d 566
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
41. F.D. v. Associated Catholic Charities of New Orleans, Inc. 480 So. 2d 380 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1985), writ denied, 481 So. 2d 1353 (1986); Allen, 378 So. 2d 1030.
42. 458 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1984).
43. Id. at 1313.
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Two points about the Wuertz decision are particularly noteworthy.
First, the court's decision apparently rested as much on the attorney's
conflict of interest as it did on the actual duress exerted by the grand-
mother. The attorney claimed to represent the natural mother as well
as the grandmother." Second, one can infer from the Wuertz decision
that in order for the forces brought to bear upon the natural mother
to constitute duress sufficient to vitiate her consent, those forces must
be extreme or unconscionable in nature.
This rather conservative approach to the definition of duress is
reflected in the decisions of many other jurisdictions. In the case of In
re Susko, 4 a Pennsylvania case, the mother of the natural mother
suffered a stroke, which subsequently lead to her death, upon learning
that her daughter, who was just seventeen years old and unmarried,
was pregnant. The natural mother consented to the adoption of her
child after her seven brothers consistently blamed her for her mother's
death and openly rejected her. The court found that the brothers' actions
were highly abusive and reached a level sufficient to vitiate the natural
mother's consent to the act of surrender. An Oklahoma court, in In re
Robin,46 found duress where the step-mother of the natural mother
threatened to kill her if she did not sign the act of surrender. These
cases, like JMP and its Louisiana predecessors demonstrate the high
threshold that the complaining party must reach before a court will find
duress.
B. Conflict of Interest
Dawn's second contention was that her consent to the surrender
was invalid because the attorney who counseled her to make that decision
acted under a conflict of interest. Dawn initially consulted with an
attorney named Perez, who afterward arranged to have one of his law
partners represent her. Perez then sought and found a couple that was
interested in adopting the child and undertook to represent them in the
adoption process. According to Dawn, she did not select her attorney
and had never met him prior to the morning she signed the act of
surrender. Under these circumstances, Dawn argued, her attorney's in-
dependence, and so also the quality of his representation, was open to
serious question.
The first circuit dismissed the allegation, finding that no attorney-
client relationship existed between Perez and Dawn. 7 The appellate court
44. Id. at 1314. The court stated "we find the act of surrender was not executed
'freely and voluntarily,' and that Ms. Wuertz lacked effective representation by an attorney
at the execution of the act of surrender."
45. 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949).
46. 571 P.2d 850 (Okla. 1977).
47. Pontiff v. Behrens, 518 So. 2d 23, 26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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stated that the attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature and
results from a clear and express agreement between the parties. 48 Because
there had been no such agreement between Dawn and Perez, the court
concluded, "no conflict of interest was created by Mr. Perez's law
partner acting as [Dawn's] attorney." '49
The supreme court likewise concluded that Dawn's consent had not
been vitiated by any unethical conduct on the part of her attorney, but
for different reasons. The court disagreed with the appellate court ruling
that without an employment contract between Dawn and Perez there
could have been no conflict of interest.5 0 The court, however, found it
unnecessary to determine whether there had in fact been such a conflict.
Relying on Wuertz, the court held that there must be a causal relationship
between any conflict of interest and the consent of the mother in order
for the conflict to vitiate the consent." In other words, the natural
mother must prove that the conflict of interest induced an error that
substantially influenced her consent to the act of surrender. Without
proof of this causal relationship, any conflict of interest is irrelevant.5 2
Therefore, the mere fact that the attorney who counseled the mother
acted under a conflict of interest will not, standing alone, warrant
annulling the act.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the supreme court
determined that Dawn had failed to prove the necessary causal rela-
tionship. Finding that the "cause" for her signing the act was Mr. and
48. See also Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 29, 262 So. 2d 350,
359 (1972) ("The attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature and is based upon
the express agreement of the parties as to the nature of work to be undertaken by the
attorney."); Massey v. Cunningham, 420 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982); Delta
Equip. and Constr. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 186 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
But cf., L.S.B.A. v. Bosworth, 481 So. 2d 567, 571 (La. 1986), in which the court states
that "[tihe existence of an attorney-client relationship turns largely on the client's subjective
belief that it exists." This seems to be in conflict with the underlying theory that there
must be a "meeting of the minds" (mutual consent to be bound) before a contract
between the parties comes into existence; see La. Civ. Code arts. 1906 and 1927.
49. Pontiff, 518 So. at 26.
50. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1011.
51. See Wuertz v. Craig, 458 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (La. 1984).
52. See La. Civ. Code art. 1949, which states:
Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation
would not have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been
known to the other party.
La. Civ. Code art. 1955 expands the causal relationship notion as follows:
Error induced by fraud need not concern the cause of the obligation to vitiate
consent, but it must concern a circumstance that has substantially influenced
that consent.
The conflict of interest claim rests upon "error" rather than fraud or duress, thus requiring
the claimant to establish the causal relationship first before proceeding further with the
allegation.
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Mrs. B.'s refusal to allow her to raise the child in their home, the court
concluded that the conflict of interest, if it existed, had had no bearing
on her decision to execute the act of surrender. Further, the majority
found no evidence to indicate that Dawn's attorney had not provided
her with sufficient information regarding the act of surrender and the
conditional aspect of the revocation of consent.
As was noted above, in reaching this result, the court was careful
to point out that it was not determining whether there had been a
conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the court did devote a considerable
portion of the opinion to a discussion of attorney conflicts of interest.
In particular, the court reviewed the "general rule of imputed disqual-
ification," which prohibits lawyers associated in the same firm from
representing "a client when any one of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so." 53 Without reading too much into the court's
discussion, one could safely assume that had the court been pressed for
a ruling, it might well have found that the attorney violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct. Clearly Perez, as the representative of the
adopting parents, could not have represented Dawn. If so, then his law
partner should have been similarly disqualified.
One interesting point about the court's decision is that it suggests
a distinction between a merely "technical" conflict-of-interest violation
and one that is sufficient to vitiate consent. The court determined that
the attorney's representation, even if there had been a conflict of interest,
had not prevented the natural mother from understanding the act of
surrender. On the contrary, the court found, the natural mother had
made a "knowing and voluntary surrender ' 5 4 of the child. It seems,
then, that to vitiate the act, the attorney's representation must not only
be marred by a conflict of interest, but must also be so ineffective that
it somehow misleads the natural mother. "Technical" breaches of the
ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest are unlikely ever to have this
result.
Justice Calogero dissented from the majority's resolution of the
conflict of interest issue." Two aspects of his opinion are particularly
interesting. First, Calogero argued that the private adoption statutes, in
particular, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.7, implicitly require that the
53. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1010-11. La. R.S. 37:211 (1988) contains the State Bar
Association's Rules of Professional Conduct, found in Chapter 4-Appendix, Art. 16,
effective January 1, 1987. Although the supreme court avoided addressing the conflict of
interest issue, it did pose the following hypothetical: "For example, if Perez had been
prohibited from representing Dawn because his representation may have been materially
limited by his own interest ... without Dawn's consent after consultation, any member
of the firm would have been prohibited from representing her also." 528 So. 2d at 1012.
54. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1012.
55. Id. at 1017 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
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surrendering mother be represented by an independent attorney. Ac-
cording to Calogero, there is a difference between the attorney's simply
reading the act of surrender to his client and his advising, or counseling,
the client of its legal ramifications. The requirement that the natural
mother be represented by an attorney is, in this view, more than just
a formality. The attorney must provide full representation, including
loyalty and counseling. 6 Calogero buttressed his interpretation of the
statutes by citing their primary objective, namely, that the natural mother
fully understand that her revocation of consent is not absolute. 7 The
legislature, he argued, recognized that the natural mother cannot freely,
voluntarily and knowingly consent to the act without effective repre-
sentation. 8 To provide further support for his position, Calogero cited
Wuertz,5 9 specifically, the statement in the opinion that the representation
provided to the surrendering parent must be more than just for ap-
pearances, and should, at the very least, be free of conflict. 60 In Wuertz,
however, the issue of duress was intertwined with the conflict-of-interest
issue.6' In reaching its decision, the Wuertz court seemingly placed more
weight on the fact that the attorney was a party to the duress by the
natural mother's grandmother, than that he acted under a conflict of
interest. Thus, the Wuertz court apparently assumed that the conflict
of interest, without duress, would not have vitiated the natural mother's
consent.
The second interesting aspect of the dissenting opinion is that it
expressly drew a distinction between a mere technical conflict-of-interest
violation and one that is sufficient to vitiate consent. According to
Calogero, a "technical conflict of interest" or a "minor deficiency" in
the lawyer's representation would not warrant vitiating an otherwise
valid act of surrender. In his opinion, however, the circumstances sur-
56. Id. at 1019.
57. Id. at 1018. Justice Calogero added:
Private adoptions entail a more informal procedure [than agency adoptions].
Some of the safeguards traditionally associated with agency adoptions are con-
spicuously absent. A well-meaning relative or friend, who may act as an in-
termediary, seldom has the training or experience demanded by the complexity
of the situation. Even if the intermediary is a more knowledgeable professional,
such as an attorney or medical doctor, he may neglect to convey much needed
information to the mother. A major deficiency in private adoptions, then, is
the natural mother's usual lack of access to information essential for her to
make an informed decision.
Id. (quoting Comment, supra note 11, at 889).
58. Id.
59. 458 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1984).
60. Id. at 1314.
61. Id. The court stated that "the act of surrender was not executed 'freely and
voluntarily,' and ... Ms. Wuertz lacked effective representation by an attorney at the
execution of the act of surrender .... "
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rounding the conflict of interest in JMP provided sufficient cause for
nullifying the act. 62 Calogero pointed to certain passages of the natural
mother's testimony which, in his view, evidenced that she did not fully
understand the legal ramifications of the act. 63 Her lack of understanding,
he suggested, was attributable to the attorney's inadequate legal rep-
resentation, which in turn sprang from his conflict of interest. Thus,
the conflict-of-interest violation here was more than merely technical.
During the time JMP was being litigated, the legislature amended
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.7 to specifically require that each party
to the act of surrender have separate representation. 64 In a footnote to
the opinion, the court acknowledged this change in the law, but held
that the prior version of the statute was controlling. 65 Although the
court did not address the ramifications of the amendment for situations
similar to that present in JMP, one can argue with some confidence
that the amendment should have no significant impact. The requirement
that each party to the adoption have separate representation does not
necessarily undermine the rule established in Wuertz and JMP that a
conflict of interest is insufficient, standing alone, to vitiate the natural
mother's consent to the act of surrender. As long as the attorney fully
advises the natural mother and she then freely and voluntarily consents
to the act of surrender, her consent apparently would not be vitiated
by a conflict of interest that constitutes a mere technical violation of
the statute. If this supposition is correct, then the natural mother's only
62. Based on Justice Calogero's opinion of the cases, "the conflict of interest coupled
with the absence from the record of evidence that relator was counseled on the specific
consequences of signing the act of surrender" should invalidate the act. JMP, 528 So.
2d at 1022. Justice Calogero contends that the majority avoids the real issue, the disposition
of the child after living with the prospective adopting family for a substantial period of
time (two and one-half years for the child in JMP) when the act of surrender is null
and void. There are two lines of thought expressed in the case law. The first view is
expressed in Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d
1168 (1976), in which the court would not return the child to the natural parents unless
such action was warranted after a hearing to determine what would be in the child's best
interest. The second view is expressed in In re B.G.D., 719 P.2d 1373 (Wyo. 1986), in
which the court held that the child should automatically be returned to his or her natural
parent(s), without regard of the adoptive parents. See infra text accompanying note 122.
63. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1020.
64. La. R.S. 9:422.7(A) (Supp. 1988), as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 702, §1,
requires that the surrendering parent "shall be represented at the execution of the act
[of surrender] by an attorney ... [who] shall not be the attorney who represents the
person or persons who are the prospective adoptive parents, or an attorney who is a
partner or employee of the attorney or law firm representing the prospective adoptive
parents." Compare with La. R.S. 9:422.7 prior to the 1987 amendment, which stated
that "[t]he surrendering parent or parents shall be represented by an attorney at the
execution of the act of surrender."
65. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1007 n. 2.
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remedy under such circumstances is to revoke her consent; she cannot
succeed in having the act set aside on the ground that her consent was
vitiated.66
IV. GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING THE "BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD"
JMP represents the first decision in which the supreme court has
provided a useful definition of the phrase "the best interest of the
child," as that phrase is used in the private adoption statutes. Before
exploring the meaning of this new definition, it will be helpful first to
examine the "best interest" standard as it was understood by the courts
of appeal before JMP. The first section of this part will be devoted to
that subject. The second section will examine the court's new standard,
as well as the sources from which that standard was derived. In the
third and final section, several problems likely to arise in the course of
implementing that standard will be discussed.
A. The "Best Interest of the Child" Prior to JMP
The idea that the child's best interest should be the most important
consideration in determining whether to uphold an adoption, more im-
portant even than parental rights, was first advanced by Judge Cardozo
back in 1925.67 In the Private Adoption Act of 1979, the Louisiana
legislature incorporated this proposal into the state's law of private
adoption. 6s Under the Act, the natural mother's revocation of consent
does not bar the adoption decree if the court determines that the adoption
"is in the best interest of the child." '69 The legislature, however, neither
66. The difference between "revoked" and "vitiated" consent is significant. When
consent is vitiated, there is no best interest hearing, in theory, because the act of surrender
never existed, and the natural mother's child should be returned.
67. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
68. 1979 La. Acts No. 686, §4. The term "the best interest of the child" is also
used in the child custody area in Civil Code article 146. The article applies to custody
disputes between the two natural parents, as in a divorce setting, and to disputes between
the natural parent and a non-parent, a situation similar to a private adoption dispute.
In a contest between the natural parent and a non-parent, the statute provides that the
court shall not award custody to the non-parent unless "an award of custody to a parent
would be detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the
best interest of the child." La. Civ. Code art. 146(B). Further, in Turner v. Turner, 455
So. 2d 1374, 1378 (La. 1884), the court held that the best interest of the child is the
appropriate standard and the sole criterion to be applied in resolving the dispute. Also,
in Boyett v. Boyett, 448 So. 2d 819, 823 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), a case involving a
custody dispute between a natural parent and a non-parent, the court acknowledged that
the natural parent has a paramount right to custody, meaning there is a natural parent
bias in this, which is consistent with the adoption disputes.
69. La. R.S. 9:422.11(A) (Supp. 1988).
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defined the phrase "the best interest of the child" nor provided the
courts with any guidelines or procedures for making this determination.
Consistently with the legislature's intention, the Louisiana Supreme Court
acknowledged, in In re Latiolais, that "the best interest of child" is
the primary criterion for determining whether a disputed adoption should
proceed. 70 The supreme court, however, repeatly neglected to define this
criterion. Lacking any clear guidance from the legislature or the supreme
court, the state's appellate courts were forced to define the criterion on
their own.
Despite the absence of any significant direction from the supreme
court, the circuit courts eventually all adopted the same basic approach
to determining the child's best interest. According to these courts, this
determination is to be made by considering several different factors,
including the fitness of the respective parties, the physical surroundings
of the adoptive parents' home as compared to those of the natural
parent's home, and the respective financial positions of the competing
parties. The second circuit's approach is representative. That court read
the private adoption statute that requires the best interest hearing in
pari materia with the adoption statute that governs DHHR's confidential
report to the court, a statute that requires DHHR to consider several
factors in deciding whether to approve the adoption.7' Those factors
include the physical and mental condition of the child, the moral and
financial fitness of the adopting parents, the conditions of the prospective
home with respect to health, and "other advantages and disadvantages
to the child." ' 72 The last factor gives the court the discretion it may
need to assure a proper judgment in unique or difficult factual situations.
Consistent with the approach of the second circuit, the third circuit used
similar factors, but, unlike that court, it focused primarily on the fi-
nancial and personal aspects of the two parties. 73
As the decision rendered by the first circuit in JMP reveals, that
court had adopted an approach to determining "the best interest of the
70. 384 So. 2d 377, 378 (La. 1980). This case involved the natural mother's second
husband seeking to adopt a child from the wife's first marriage. The child's natural
father, Mr. Latiolais, opposed the adoption. Because Latiolais had failed to pay court-
ordered support, the trial court granted the adoption. Finding that the adoption was not
in the best interest of the child, the court of appeal reversed, 376 So. 2d 555 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1979), and the supreme court affirmed. The factor crucial to the supreme court
was that the termination of the father's relationship with his daughter would not be in
the child's best interest.
71. In re McK, 444 So. 2d 1362 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984). See La. R.S. 9:427(A)
(Supp. 1988), which provides the required information to be included in the DHHR
investigative report and supplied to the court.
72. 444 So. 2d at 1366.
73. In re Kitler v. Kitler, 445 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 447 So.
2d 1069 (1984).
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child" that was similar to that of the second and third circuits. In JMP
the first circuit affirmed the lower court's decision after reviewing the
factors that the lower court had used to determine the child's best
interest. These factors included the ages of the parties, their maturity,
each party's home environment, and the respective financial positions
of each of the parties. 74 Both courts appeared to place their primary
emphasis upon the last of these factors.
As this review of the jurisprudence discloses, none of the circuits
expressly stated, or implied, that the child's psychological state, or
relationship with his or her parents, is the most important consideration
in determining whether to permit a disputed adoption to proceed. Rather,
most courts treated those factors as secondary to the physical, mental,
or other attributes and rights of the various parties. Even the second
circuit, which did recognize the child's mental and physical condition
as a factor, merely placed this factor on a par with all of the others. 71
B. The "Best Interest of the Child" After JMP
In JMP, the Louisiana Supreme Court, breaking with the approach
of the appellate courts, devised a new method for determining "the best
interest of the child" in the context of private adoptions. Prefacing its
discussion of this standard, the court remarked that "[tihe basic concept
underlying [it] is nothing less than the dignity of the child as an individual
human being." ' 76 Any "best interest" standard, the court explained,
cannot be static, but rather must draw its meaning from the "evolving
body of knowledge concerning child health, psychology and welfare." 77
In devising its standard, the court looked to the work of some of
the major contributors to this "evolving body of knowledge." From
the work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit,78 the
court derived the basic premise of its new standard, namely, that "the
best interest of the child" hinges on placing the child with his or her
74. Pontiff v. Behrens, 518 So. 2d 23, 27 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
75. In re McK, 444 So. 2d at 1366. Query: What did the supreme court mean in
In re Latiolais, 384 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980), when it stated that the best interest of the
child should be the primary concern of the court? Did the court view the child's best
interest as a separate, superior factor in the analysis, or as a general concept comprised
of all the factors reviewed by the court on an equal footing, as the circuit courts were
doing?
76. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1013.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1014. See J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interest
of the Child (1973) [hereinafter Goldstein]. This is consistent with the legislative intent
of the Private Adoption Act because it has been suggested that the drafter's use of the
phrase in the Private Adoption Act was also influenced by the work of Goldstein. See
Comment, supra note II.
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"psychological parent." '79 The court also adopted the three guidelines
developed by Robert Mnookin ° to assist courts in making this premise
operative. The guidelines are as follows: (1) is each party seeking custody
fit to serve as the child's parent; (2) if so, from the child's perspective
have either of the adoptive parents become a "psychological parent;"
(3) if the answer to the second inquiry is "no," then the child should
be returned to the natural mother of the child, that is, the biological
parent; if the answer to the second inquiry is "yes," then the child
should remain with the adoptive parents and the adoption should pro-
ceed.9 ' After setting out these guidelines, the supreme court gave a brief
explanation of each of them and defined the proper scope of the new
standard.12
Regarding the first guideline, which concerns the fitness of the
parties, the court stated that custody may never be awarded to a party
who may "endanger the health of the child under minimum standards
for child protection. '8 3 Thus, where one of the parties presents "an
immediate and substantial threat to the child's physical health, ' 8 4 custody
must be awarded to the other party. If a party is found "unfit" the
analysis stops; since that party cannot gain custody, it serves no purpose
to review the psychological factors. 5
The second guideline, which concerns the notion of a psychological
parent, forms the heart of the court's new approach. The court explained
that whether there is a psychological parent must be viewed from the
79. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1013.
80. Id. at 1013. See R. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions
in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226, 282 (1975). The guidelines
are based on two underlying objectives of Goldstein: first, to make the decision maker
aware that the child is a victim, and without a quick resolution of the custody dispute
there is a risk of harm to his development; second, the child's interest should neither be
balanced against, nor subordinated to, the adults' interest. J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A.
Solnit, supra note 78, at 54.
81. Mnookin, supra note 80, at 282, 287. In JMP, the supreme court stated:
If the natural mother is fit, the broad social policy of basing custody and
responsibility on the biological relationship outweighs whatever material advan-
tages might be provided by the adoptive parents, if neither of the adoptive
parents is the child's psychological parent. On the the other hand, if the adoptive
parents are fit, and the child has formed a psychological attachment ... the
adoptive parents should be preferred so as to avoid the grave risk of mental
and emotional harm to the child which would result from the change in custody,
even if the natural parent is relatively affluent.
528 So. 2d at 1015-16.
82. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1013-15. The supreme court also acknowledged that Mnookin's
work was the primary source of the analysis. Id. at 1013 n.7. See Mnookin, supra note
80.





child's perspective. That relationship develops as a result of the inter-
action between the child and an adult, where the adult has made the
child feel wanted and needed by providing for his or her physical and
emotional demands1 6 Importantly, the court noted that an adult can
be the child's psychological parent, without being the biological parent. 7
According to the court, the severance of this relationship may cause
great harm to the child's mental and physical development."8 To forestall
this negative effect on the child, he or she should be placed with the
psychological parent whenever possible. 9
The third guideline, the court pointed out, comes into play only
when the court finds that the natural parent is fit and that neither of
the adoptive parents is the child's psychological parent. Under the guide-
lines, a psychological parent who is not a biological parent should be
awarded custody over the biological parent. 90 When there is no psy-
chological parent, however, the need to preserve the child's "sense of
lineage and access to his extended biological family" and society's high
value on "family autonomy" justify placing the child with the natural
parent. 9' By assuring the placement of the child with the natural parent
in those situations where all other things are equal, the third guideline
builds into the standard a natural parent preference. This preference,
however, is consistent with the social values incorporated into our law. 92
After explaining the general contours of the three guidelines, the
court offered a few comments regarding their scope. The guidelines, the
court stated, are to be used in most, but not all, private adoption
disputes. 93 The court delineated two categories of limitations. 94 First, the
guidelines are restricted to use in "private litigation." The guidelines
86. Id. at 1014.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1013. The natural parent preference incorporated into the guidelines is
consistent with the supreme court's underlying theory in the treatment of past adoption
cases. Wuertz v. Craig, 458 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1984); Roy v. Speer, 249 S. 2d 1034, 192
So. 2d 554 (1966). Also, the natural parent bias can be seen in child custody disputes
between a natural parent and a non-parent. La. Civ. Code art. 146(B); see supra note
68. Compare with the fact that some jurisdictions have rejected the natural parent pref-
erence as being contrary to Goldstein's theory because it prevents the true, or pure,
determination of "the best interest of the child" from being the primary concern of the
court. Alaska, S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997, 1002 (Alaska 1982); California, In re Barnett's
Adoption, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354 P.2d 18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1960); Idaho, In re Anderson,
99 Idaho 805, 589 P.2d 957 (1979); New Mexico, Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 307
P.2d 175 (1957).
90. See Mnookin, supra note 80, at 286.






therefore have no application in cases arising under the laws governing
child neglect and foster care. Second, and more importantly, the court
stated that the guidelines are not to be applied to other custody-type
disputes. One example of such a dispute is where the suit is between
two fit natural parents who are also psychological parents of the child. 95
Further, the court noted that when there are two psychological parents,
current psychological theories when there are two psychological parents,
current psychological theories cannot provide a means of choosing be-
tween the parents.96
Applying the guidelines delineated above, the supreme court in JMP
found that the trial court had failed to consider whether a psychological
relationship had developed between one of the adopting parents and the
child. 97 The court noted that the trial court heard no testimony from
a psychologist or psychiatrist and did not weigh the biological relationship
between the child and the natural mother.9 Instead, the court based its
decision primarily on the financial situations of each party. 99 In view
of the defects in the best interest hearing, the supreme court vacated
the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case so that the
trial court could hold another best interest hearing using the guidelines.l°°
C. Problems In Implementing JMP
Although the supreme court in JMP has provided guidelines that
the trial court must use to determine what is in the child's best interest,
that guidance may be of limited value. As has been noted, those guide-
lines require the lower court to determine whether any of the parties
to the disputed adoption is the child's "psychological parent." However,
as the supreme court itself acknowledged, the use of the guidelines is
not appropriate in all private adoption disputes.' 0' Further, and more
importantly, the criteria that the supreme court provided to assist the
trial court in ascertaining who is the "psychological parent" are, at
best, vague.
In the case of In re G.E. T. 0 2 the first circuit became the first
appellate court to struggle with the application of the new JMP guide-
lines. In that case, the adopting parents were the maternal grandparents




98. Id. at 1015-16.
99. Id. at 1015.
100. Id. at 1017.
101. Id. at 1015.
102. 529 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
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child's father revoked his consent, triggering a best interest hearing. In
order to assist him in making the best interest determination, the trial
judge appointed a psychologist to examine the child and the parties. At
the hearing, the psychologist stated that, in his opinion, the natural
parents were not capable parents, but the grandparents were. Further,
he stated that the child regarded both her natural father and her grand-
parents as "psychological parents." Although he refused to offer an
opinion regarding whether the adoption itself was in the child's best
interest, he did indicate that it was in the child's best interest that she
remain in the grandparents' custody. 03 The trial court, in a decision
rendered prior to the supreme court's opinion in JMP, ruled in favor
of the natural father. Although the court acknowledged that the natural
parents "have their problems," it refused to find that the natural father
was unfit. 104 Further, the trial court, noting that the natural parents
were separated, concurred with the father's claim that placing the child
with the maternal grandparents would have the effect of terminating his
relationship with his child. 0 5 According to the court, preserving the
father-daughter relationship would promote the child's best interest.) 6
On appeal, the first circuit reviewed the trial court's decision in
light of the JMP guidelines. Applying those guidelines, the court of
appeal first found that both parties to the dispute were fit. 10 7 The court
expressly disagreed with the psychologist's conclusion regarding the fath-
er's fitness, ruling that marital difficulties alone do not make one an
unfit parent. Second, the court concluded that both the "psychological
parent" and biological parent factors pointed in favor of placing the
child with the natural father. The court evidently accepted the psy-
chologist's conclusion that the child considered both her natural father
and her maternal grandparents as "psychological parents."''0 For this
reason, the court concluded that severing the child's relationship with
her father would have a traumatic impact on the child. According to
the court, "[iun view of the fact that [the child] has a psychological
relationship with her natural parents, as well as her grandparents, the
existence of this relationship with her grandparents does not mitigate
in favor of adoption."109
The GET case illustrates several problems that are likely to arise as
the lower courts endeavor to follow the JMP guidelines. First, because
103. Id. at 527.
104. Id. at 528.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 529.
108. Id.
109. Id. Query: Could the court have dismissed the private adoption issue and treated




of the court's cursory and somewhat confusing account of the limitations
upon the scope of the guidelines, the lower courts may end up applying
the guidelines in situations for which they are not designed. As was
noted above, the court pointed out in explaining the limitations on the
applicability of the guidelines, that "existing psychological theories do
not provide the basis for choosing generally between two adults where
the child has some relationship and psychological attachment to each."' 10
If one examines the sources from which the court drew the guidelines,
particularly the work of Professor Mnookin, then it is clear that the
court, in making this statement, intended to preclude the application of
the guidelines to any situations in which the child has a psychological
relationship with both parties, regardless of the nature of the dispute.
The court, however, did not make this point clearly. In the course of
the court's discussion, the statement regarding multiple-psychological
parent situations follows immediately after the court's statement that
the guidelines do not apply to child custody disputes. Consequently, one
who is unfamiliar with the sources from which the court drew the
guidelines might conclude that the court's remark about multiple-psy-
chological parents was related only to the limitation regarding custody
cases, and perhaps was intended to explain why the guidelines will not
function properly in the custody context. Evidently, the GET court read
the guidelines in this way. This reading of the statement, although
understandable, was erroneous. The guidelines clearly should not have
been applied in this case, given that the child had multiple "psychological
parents." Application of the guidelines to such situations will inevitably
result in a favorable ruling for the natural parent, even when such a
result may be contrary to the child's real best interest.
The second problem evidenced in GET arises out of the fact that
the guidelines require the trial court to rely heavily on the assessments
of psychological or psychiatric experts in making the best interest de-
termination. This problem has two aspects. First, there is the danger
that the trial court will abdicate its power to the psychologist. The first
circuit's decision in GET illustrates this danger. There the court simply
adopted, without any significant analysis or critique, the expert's con-
clusion that the child had formed a psychological relationship with both
parties. Second, if the expert cannot make or is unwilling to give an
opinion regarding the fitness of the parties or the existence of a "psy-
chological parent," then the system tends to break down and the guide-
lines cannot function properly. Because the JMP guidelines require a
determination of whether any of the parties is a "psychological parent"
of the child, it seems clear that trial courts must, as a matter of necessity,
turn to experts in the field of psychology or psychiatry for assistance.
110. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1012; Mnookin, supra note 80, at 287.
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Like the psychologist in GET, however, the expert appointed by the
court may be unable to give an opinion regarding the child's best interest.
Further, the expert may be unable to determine whether the child has
developed a special "psychological" relationship with any of the parties.
In such instances, the court might conclude that the second JMP factor-
the "psychological parent" inquiry-is utterly indeterminate and, then,
by default, proceed to a consideration of the third factor-the "natural
parent" inquiry. If the court does so, however, then it will be forced
to rule in favor of the natural parent. One might question whether
automatically placing the child with the natural parent in such circum-
stances would necessarily further the child's real best interest.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the guidelines may lead
the trial court to an incorrect assessment of the child's best interest in
some situations. One possible solution to both of the problems discussed
above is for the legislature to amend the private adoption statutes to
provide some test or standard whereby the trial court can determine the
child's best interest in situations for which the three JMP guidelines
were not designed. For example, the legislature could provide a multi-
factor test similar to that provided in Louisiana Civil Code article 146(C),
which governs the resolution of child custody disputes between the two
parents."' Among the factors listed in that article are the moral fitness
of the parties, the permanence of the family unit, the child's school
record, the length of time the child has lived in a stable home envi-
Ill. La. Civ. Code art. 146(C) provides a list of factors which the lower courts are
to consider when determining the best interest of the child:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties
involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,
affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child
in his religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be
of sufficient age to express a preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage
a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent.
(k) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.




ronment, and the ability of the parties to provide affection, guidance,
and educational resources for the child. So long as the legislature re-
stricted the use of such a test to situations for which the JMP guidelines
are clearly ill-suited, the supreme court's desire to ground the deter-
mination of the child's best interest upon the Goldstein theory could,
at least to some extent, still be respected. 1 2
V. EXPEDITED HEARING PROCEDURES FOR PRIVATE ADOPTION
DISPUTES
In JMP the supreme court addressed the need to expedite the pro-
ceedings in private adoption disputes, noting that what is in the child's
best interest can change considerably during the actual litigation process.
JMP itself provides a good illustration of this problem. At the time of
the trial court's best interest hearing, the child was five months old,
but by the time the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court
with instructions to conduct a second hearing, the child was over two
and one-half years old. As the court acknowledged, the child had most
likely developed a psychological relationship with one or both adoptive
parents by this time. 3 The problem, then, is that the longer the adoptive
parents can "drag out" the judicial proceeding, the more likely the
court will be to find that they are the "psychological parents." Expedited
procedures would not only ensure that the natural mother who has
timely revoked her consent would have a true opportunity to reclaim
112. Following this same line of thought, a law review casenote concerning the Alaska
Supreme Court decision in the adoption case of S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997 (Alaska
1982), suggests other factors to be considered in addition to the psychological condition
of the child in question. In the casenote, Family Law: Natural Parent Preference or the
Child's Best Interest: The Court's Dilemma in S.O. v. W.S. (Alaska 1982), 12 UCLA-
Alaska L. Rev. 141, 153 (1982-1983), the author states:
Testimony regarding considerations such as separate trauma and continuity needs
in children of a particular age will be useful, as will expert testimony addressing
the psychological make-up of the child in question. Other important factors
which might be introduced during the hearing include (1) the quality and length
of the emotional attachments; (2) the amount of time the child has lived with
the prospective adoptive parents; (3) the amount of time the child lived with,
and has been separated from, the natural parent; (4) evidence of the character,
moral fitness, and maturity of the parents and prospective adoptive parents; (5)
the commitment to the care and development of the child; (6) the home en-
vironment and family setting, and its stability; (7) the age, sex and health of
the child; (8) the desirability of continuing the existing child-third party rela-
tionship. Finally, and certainly not to be overlooked if the child is of a reasonable
age, the wishes of the child should be respectfully considered.
The factors suggested are similar to those provided in Louisiana Civil Code article 146(C),
quoted at supra note 111, provided to rebut the presumption of joint custody between
the two parents.
113. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1016.
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her child, but would also decrease the risk of psychological harm to
the child.
In an effort to redress the problems associated with delays in re-
solving adoption disputes, the JMP court took two significant steps.
First, it requested that the state's judicial and legislative reform bodies
study these problems and propose appropriate remedial legislation.'
4
Second, the court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, devised several
procedures for the docketing of private adoption cases that the courts
must follow until remedial legislation is adopted. The time frames set
up by the court are as follows: (1) within twenty days of receiving
formal or informal notice of the mother's revocation of her consent to
the act of surrender, the trial court must rule on the best interest issue;
(2) the trial court must fix the return date of any appeal at no more
than twenty days after the day that estimated costs are paid; and (3)
within twenty days of the lodging of the record on appeal, the court
of appeal must hear and decide the matter. Unfortunately, the imple-
mentation of the court's expedited docketing procedures is not unprob-
lematic.
First, there are a number of difficulties with the court's suggestion
that the first period is to commence upon the lower court's "receiving
formal or informal" notice of revocation. One question that naturally
arises is what is an informal notice and how it is received. Would a
phone call to the judge or a handwritten note left on his desk constitute
informal notice? Is the court in "receipt" of notice when the writing
(assuming there is one) is left with the clerk of court or an employee
of the judge, or only when the judge himself becomes aware of the
mother's desire to revoke? A related problem is the danger that the
form of notice may in some cases be too "informal" to apprise the
court of the dispute. It is not difficult to imagine a case in which the
natural mother submits an informal writing to the clerk of court or one
of the judge's employees, and the clerk or employee, because the writing
does not bear a caption or other language clearly indicative of the
mother's intent to revoke her consent, fails to recognize that the writing
needs to be brought to the attention of the judge immediately. In such
a case, it will be difficult for the court to comply with the twenty day
rule. In recognizing the possibility of informal notice, the court's ob-
114. Id. at 1017. The court stated "Therefore, this court recommends to each judicial
and legislative reform body that this problem be addressed and that remedial legislation
and court rules be proposed as soon as possible. The clerk of this court is hereby instructed
to send a copy of this opinion to each law reform body." In response to the court's
request, the Louisiana State Law Institute (LSLI) has undertaken the task of proposing
statutory revisions to the legislature. Professor Lucy McGough of the Paul M. Hebert
Law Center, Louisiana State University, is preparing preliminary drafts of these revisions
in connection with the development of a Louisiana children's code.
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jective was most likely to protect the surrendering parent from losing
her ability to revoke her consent because of noncompliance with pro-
cedural technicalities. Consequently, in future cases the supreme court
will probably define "informal notice" liberally.
The notion of "formal" notice of revocation is likewise plagued by
difficulties. The term "formal notice" presumably refers to the formal
act of revocation that is contemplated by the private adoption statutes
governing revocation of consent. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.10
specifies that this act is to be sent to the adoptive parents "or the
attorney at law who represented them in the act of surrender.""' 5 The
statute, however, does not state how the court is to receive notice of
the act. This omission is especially troublesome when one considers that
the statutes do not require that the act of revocation be filed with the
court, much less provide a time within which the court must receive
the act.
Second, the supreme court did not address how the docketing rules
should be applied in a case, such as JMP, where the natural mother
alleges that her consent to the act of surrender has been vitiated by
duress or fraud. The first of the court's new procedural rules dictates
that the best interest issue be resolved within twenty days of the trial
court's receipt of notice that the natural parent has revoked her consent.
Must the duress issue be resolved within the twenty day period also?
In such a situation, the natural mother and the court would probably
want to dispose of the consent issue first. If the court were to determine
that the natural mother's consent had been vitiated, then there would
simply be no need to hold a best interest hearing; if the natural mother
did not truly consent to the surrender, the child presumably would have
to be returned to her immediately."l 6 The difficulty, however, is that it
may not be possible for the parties to prepare their cases and for the
court to hear and resolve the consent issue within the twenty day period
allotted by the expedited hearing rules.
The third problem with the expedited hearing procedures is closely
related to the second. Within the first twenty day period, the lower
court, in order to comply with the JMP guidelines, must determine (1)
115. La. R.S. 9:422.10 (Supp. 1988).
116. In his dissent, Justice Calogero states that the court failed to address the real
issue-which is after an act of surrender-found to be invalid due to vitiated consent,
should the child be returned to the natural mother or should there still be a best interest
hearing to determine if the adoption should proceed? JMP, 528 So.2d at 1022. Justice
Calogero relies on Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 124, 367
A.2d 1168 (1976), which views consent as an issue separate from whether the child should
be returned to the natural parent. The answer to this issue depends upon whether the
court and/or the legislature decide to eliminate any preferences for the rights of the
parents and look solely to the child's best interest. See JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1022-23.
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whether both parties are fit and (2) if so, whether the child developed
a psychological relationship with one or both of the adoptive parents.
To answer these questions, the trial court must take several preliminary
steps. First, DHHR must prepare fitness reports on both parties to be
submitted to the court at the best interest hearing." 7 Second, according
to the JMP opinion the court must, or at least should, appoint a
psychologist or psychiatrist to examine the child and his environment
so that he may render an opinion regarding whether a "psychological
parent" exists. Even if one ignores the time that will be consumed with
the appointment procedures and the qualification of the psychologist or
psychiatrist, and the additional cost that must be borne by the parties
in order to engage the psychologist," 8 it is doubtful whether the psy-
chologist will be able to conduct the examination, compile the necessary
information, and determine if a psychological parent exists within the
limited time allotted for the best interest hearing.119
Yet another problem associated with the court's expedited hearing
procedures is that they afford a tremendous, presumably unintended
advantage to the natural parent. As has been noted, the JMP "best
interest" guidelines require that the child be placed with the natural
parent unless one of the adoptive parents has become the child's "psy-
chological parent."120 The psychological parent-child relationship, how-
ever, takes time to develop. Because the best interest hearing must be
conducted within twenty days of the notice of revocation and the rev-
ocation must be made within thirty days of the execution of the act of
surrender, the natural parents will usually have no more than fifty days
within which to develop this relationship with the child. This brief period
may simply not be long enough, especially if the child is a newborn.
Even if a newborn child could in theory develop a psychological parent-
child relationship with one of the adoptive parents during its brief period
with them, the examining psychologist probably would not be able to
117. La. R.S. 9:427 (Supp. 1988).
118. Query: Should the court appoint the psychologist or psychiatrist, or will each
party be able to bring in their own expert witness? It would appear that the objective
of the psychologist's determination should be neutral to fulfill the underlying theory of
Goldstein. See La. Civ. Code art. 146(H), which provides that in custody proceedings
the court has the option of selecting the "mental health professional" or one agreed upon
by the parties. Also, concerning who would qualify as a "psychologist," the court may
look to La. Civ. Code art. 146(H), which defines a "mental health professional" for the
purposes of Article 146 as "a psychiatrist or a person who possesses a Master's degree
in counseling, social work, psychology, or marriage and family counseling."
119. The psychologist will not even have twenty days to complete his research and
compile the results into an opinion concerning whether a "psychological parent" exists
unless the appointment is made on the date of the filing of the revocation with the court.
120. JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1015.
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detect the existence of the relationship. 2 1 Therefore, the twenty day
rule, combined with the thirty day revocation period and the JMP
guidelines, creates a "bias" in favor of the natural mother; once that
natural mother is found to be fit, she will almost automatically win the
dispute.
The following scenario illustrates this problem. The parties arrange
the private adoption prior to the birth of the child and the natural
mother executes an authentic act of surrender on the fifth day after
the birth, in compliance with the statute. The natural mother formally
revokes her consent to the act of surrender on the thirtieth day after
the date of execution and gives the trial court notice of the revocation.
The trial court must now decide the best interest issue within twenty
days from the receipt of this formal revocation. The court appoints a
psychologist, who then begins gathering information necessary for him
to form an opinion regarding whether the child has a psychological
parent. The psychologist will have a maximum of twenty days to conduct
his investigation. The psychologist, because the infant is still too young
to be tested or evaluated successfully, is unable to render an opinion
regarding whether a psychological relationship has developed within the
fifty day period during which the child has been with the adoptive
parents. The trial court, finding that each party is a fit parent and that
the child has no psychological parent, rules in favor of the natural
parent. As this scenario demonstrates, the natural parent preference that
121. See In re G.E.T., 529 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (the court appointed
psychologist could not make a definitive judgment as to the existence of one parent being
the psychological parent of the two natural parents.); Mnookin, supra note 80, at 287.
At what age the child's "psychological parent" can be determined was addressed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in distinguishing the result of two cases with similar facts,
Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 337 A.2d 628 (1977), and Sorentino v. Family & Children's
Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168 (1976). Both cases involved a private
adoption dispute and the court's use of the Goldstein theory, with the consent of the
natural mother being vitiated by duress in Sorentino and consent being effectively revoked
in Sees. In Sorentino, the child was returned to the natural mother, but in Sees the child
was not returned. The difference in the results of the two cases is based on the age of
the children involved, 31 months in Sorentino and less than one year old in Sees. In
Sees, the court, considering the age of the child, found "no firm basis to conclude that
an inquiry focusing upon the existence of 'psychological parenthood,' . . . with an infant
just one year old, would be at all helpful or productive in deciding whether that child
could be raised adequately and decently by his own mother without ruinous psychological
trauma." Sees, 74 N.J. at 222, 377 A.2d at 640. In the case of a three year old, the
court felt the potential risk of harm was too great to allow the child to return to the
natural mother, even though her consent had been vitiated. Therefore, the court in Sees
determined that a child of one year of age or less would not have developed a psychological
parent as opposed to the situation of a 31 month old child who would probably have
developed such a relationship, thus the child must have obtained a sufficient age, somewhere
between those in the two cases, before the "psychological parent" can exist.
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is built into the JMP guidelines is amplified when the time for resolving
the adoption dispute is shortened.
VI. CONCLUSION
The most reasonable place to begin in resolving many of the problems
discussed in this article is at their source-the provisions of the private
adoption statutes that concern the act of surrender and the revocation
of consent. As JMP illustrates, those provisions are ambiguous and
confusing in many respects and contain a number of pitfalls for the
unwary. Although the JMP court did resolve some of the problems
associated with the private adoption process, it left many of those
problems unredressed and, as was argued above, seems to have generated
still more difficulties. If the private adoption is to remain a viable
alternative to the agency adoption, the legislature must act quickly to
correct these problems. The recent amendment to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:422.7 explicitly requiring each party to retain independent
counsel is a positive step in the right direction. Some additional steps
that the legislature should consider making are suggested below.
First, it is suggested that the legislature amend the private adoption
statutes to establish a single form for giving notice to the trial court
that the natural parent wishes to revoke her consent. The amendment
should require that the form contain all information necessary to enable
the court to begin acting on the dispute immediately, including the
identities of the parties, their attorneys, and the child. Requiring a single
form of this type would avoid the difficulties associated with the "in-
formal notice" recognized by JMP. Such a requirement could be in-
corporated into Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.10, the statute governing
the notice of revocation.
Second, the legislature should adopt procedures for the filing of the
notice of revocation, including a provision that designates who must
file that notice with the court. Since the burden of filing arguably should
be placed on the party seeking to stop the adoption, the natural parent,
or her attorney, should be required to file the notice form. Because the
supreme court's expedited docketing procedures apply only after the
court receives notice of the revocation, this amendment would eliminate
any time delays in actually starting the litigation process. Further, the
amendment would aid in reducing the confusion presently surrounding
who is responsible for filing the declaration of revocation. By getting
the dispute to the attention of the trial court more quickly, the parties
would be one step closer to resolving the dispute in a timely fashion.
Third, the JMP guidelines, it is submitted, should be supplemented
to allow trial judges greater discretion to deal with the infinite factual
variations presented by private adoptions cases. As was demonstrated
above, the JMP guidelines do not provide an appropriate means for
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determining the best interest of the child in some private adoption
situations. Thus, the legislature should develop a test for determining
the best interest of the child based upon the factors listed in Louisiana
Civil Code article 146(C), the child custody statute. The amendment
should provide that this list of factors is to be used only in cases for
which the three JMP guidelines are not suited, such as cases like GET
and those in which the trial court cannot determine whether there is a
"psychological parent." By restricting the scope of the test's application
in this way, full effect can still be given to the supreme court's JMP
guidelines, which correctly make the relationship between the child and
its "psychological parent" the most important factor in the determining
the child's best interest.
These proposals for reform, if adopted, would go a long way toward
remedying many of the deficiencies in the state's private adoption scheme
that surfaced in JMP and would render that scheme more compatible
with the best interest guidelines and the expedited hearing procedures
established by the supreme court in that case. Perhaps more importantly,
the proposals would further the supreme court's commendable efforts
in JMP to make the private adoption scheme more sensitive to the "best
interest of the child."' 22
Mark Alan Bodron
122. Two final comments:
First, It should be noted that even if these revisions of the statutes are made by the
legislature, any potential effect will be moot so long as the statutes continue to recognize
the notarial act alternative. The statutes give no indication regarding the content or proper
form of the notarial act or how it can be revoked. In effect, it reflects an adoptive
parent bias. As the law currently stands, any current or future protections afforded to
the natural parent can be circumvented by use of the notarial act alternative.
Second, a post script to JMP should be mentioned. In its decree, the supreme court
stated that "the case is remanded to the trial court for a new best interests hearing,
during which this court shall retain jurisdiction so that any dissatisfied party may apply
directly here for relief." JMP, 528 So. 2d at 1017. The trial court did conduct a new
best interest hearing and ruled in favor of the adoption by Mr. and Mrs. J.M.P., granting
them an interlocutory decree of adoption, with the right to petition for a final decree of
adoption at the appropriate time. Pursuant to the supreme court's decree in JMP, after
the trial court's ruling, Dawn applied directly to the supreme court to review the lower
court's decision. After a review of the record, the supreme court stated that "we conclude
that the trial court's decision was not based on any manifest error of fact or error of
law. Accordingly, [Dawn's] application for relief is denied." In re JMP, No. 88-C-008.
1989 LEXIS 46, 1989 WL 887 (La. Jan. 6, 1989).
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